论文摘要的英语翻译

ABSTRACT

Earningsmanagementisacommonphenomenoninthecapitalmarket.Accordingtodomesticandoverseasstudies,firms'strongincentivetomanipulateearningsarisefromavoidingreportingannuallosses,andfromstockmarketpressuretomeetanalystexpectations,etc.

Withthedevelopmentoflawandregulationsystem,andtherisingregulatorypressure,firmshaveswitchedfromaccrual-basedtorealearningsmanagementmethods.

Comparedwithaccrual-basedearningsmanagement,realactivitiesmanipulationaccomplishedbynormaloperationalpracticesisrelativelylessrisky,althoughthistwokindsofmethodsdonotviolateaccountingstandards.

Inthestructureofcorporategovernance,CFOservesasastrategymanagergradually.Theaccountingsystemistotallycontrolledbythem,andthecompany'sstrategicdecisionsandexecutionsareaffectedbythem.Inlightofupperechelonstheory,thebackgroundofdifferentCFOshaveanimpactoncompany'sstrategicdecisions.FirmsappointtothepositionofCFOpersonnelwhohastheworkingexperienceofauditor.TheCFO'sspecializedknowledgeoftheaccountingsystemsandpoliciescanenhancehisorherabilitytoensureproperaccountingtreatment.Toinspireconfidencefromtheboardofdirectors,anewCFOneedstoshowsignificantprogressinhisorherearlyappointments.Inthiscircumstance,earningsmanagementcanbecomeawaytomanipulateearnings.Andgivenrealactivitiesmanipulationhasthefeaturessuchasconcealing,lessrisky,theCFO'spriorexperienceasauditorsmayhavesomeimpactonthechoicebetweenrealactivitiesmanipulationandaccrual-basedearningsmanagement.

ToanalyzetheinfluenceofCFO'sworkingexperienceasauditorinthechoicebetweenaccrual-basedearningsmanagementandrealactivitiesearningsmanagement,firmsfrom2002to2011withCFOturnoverareselectedassample.Ididmultipleregressionfrombothhorizontalandverticaldimensions.Inhorizontalanalysis,comparedwiththefirmsthatnewCFOhasnoauditorbackground,firmsthatnewCFOhasauditorbackgroundhaveahighlevelofrealactivitiesearningsmanagement.Inverticalanalysis,thefirmsthatnewCFOshasauditorbackgroundhaveahighlevelofrealactivitiesearningsmanagement,whilethelevelofearningsmanagementdoesnotchangeinthefirmsthatnewCFOhasnoauditorbackground.

Inaddition,Ididmultipleregressionfromtheactualcontrollerperspectiveandtheregulatoryenvironmentperspective.Fromthepointofactualcontroller,IfindthatCFOwithauditorbackgroundhavenoinfluenceonthechoiceofearningsmanagementmethodinthestate-ownedfirms.Ontheotherhand,innon-statefirms,comparedwiththefirmsthatnewCFOhasnoauditorbackground,firmsthatnewCFOhasauditorbackgroundhaveahighlevelofrealactivitiesearningsmanagement.Fromthepointofregulatoryenvironment,IfindthatCFOswithauditorbackgroundhavenoinfluenceintheperiodbeforetheenforcementofnewaccountingstandards.Butaftertheenforcementofnewaccountingstandards,comparedwiththefirmsthatnewCFOhasnoauditorbackground,firmsthatnewCFOhasauditorbackgroundhaveahighlevelofrealactivitiesearningsmanagement.

Therefore,theconclusionofmydissertationisasfollows:comparedwiththefirmsthatnewCFOhasnoauditorbackground,firmsthatnewCFOhasauditorbackgroundhaveahighlevelofrealactivitiesmanipulation.Theconclusionwillbemoreobviousinnon-statefirmsandintheperiodaftertheenforcementofnewaccountingstandards.

ABSTRACT

ZhejiangProvinceasanimportantpartofthecountryhascontributedagreatdealofstrengthforthecountry'seconomicconstruction.Thelistedcompaniesonbehalfoflocalbusinessgroupsplayanimportantroleinaddressingemploymentandincreasingtaxrevenue.Seniormanagersareimportanthumanresourcesinacompany,andtheyhaveapivotalroleinthecompany'sdevelopmentofstrategicdecision-making.Itneedstobeexploredfortheeffectofthevariousbackgroundcharacteristicsofexecutivesoflistedcompaniesonthecompanyperformancelevel,andtostudyitmaybetherealityofseniorexecutivesselectionandappointmentforreferencevalue.

Therefore,thepaperfocusesontherelationshipbetweenthebackgroundfeaturesofexecutivesofZhejianglistedcompaniesandenterpriseperformance.

Inthispaper,theresearchisbasedontheupperechelonstheory,socialcapitaltheoryandagencytheory,combinedwithalargenumberofrelevantdocuments,definingthenatureofpropertyrights,theconceptofexecutivebackgroundcharacteristicsandenterpriseperformance.ThelistedcompaniesinZhejiangprovincearedividedintodifferentpartsaccordingtothenatureofpropertyrights,whicharecalledstate-ownedenterprisesandprivateenterprises.Theexecutivebackgroundcharacteristicsaredefinedastheproportionoffemaleexecutives,theageofexecutives,theeducationofexecutives,theproportionofexecutiveshareholdings,andtheseparationcaseofthejobbetweenstakepresidentandgeneralmanager.Thebackgroundfeaturesofstate-ownedandprivateenterprisesexecutivesareanalyzed.

andfinancialconditionfornearlythreeyearsareanalyzedtoo.Inordertobetterreflectthelevelofperformanceobjectivelyandreasonably,webuildacomprehensiveenterpriseperformanceevaluationexpressionsusingthefactoranalysis.Throughdescriptivestatisticalanalysis,correlationanalysisandmultiplelinearregressionanalysis,wehaveexaminedtherelationshipbetweenthebackgroundcharacteristicsofexecutivesoflistedstate-ownedenterprisesandprivateenterprisesinZhejiangProvinceandenterpriseperformance.

Empiricalresearchonthefullsamplebystate-ownedandprivateenterprises,wefoundbothconsistentresults:theproportionoffemaleexecutivesandcorporateperformanceissignificantlynegativelycorrelated,theageofexecutives,theeducationofexecutivesandtheseparationcaseofjobsbetweenthestakepresidentandgeneralmanagerandenterpriseperformancearesignificantlypositivelycorrelated,theproportionofexecutiveshareholdingsandcorporateperformanceisrelatedbutnotsignificant.Althoughtheempiricalresultsofthewholesamplearesame,butthebackgroundcharacteristicsofexecutivesandcorporateperformancemayhaveadifferentrelationshipbetweendifferentperformancelevelsofcompanies.Continuingtostudy,accordingtotheperformancelevelofgoodorder,thestate-ownedenterprisesandprivateenterprisesareevenlydividedintothreegroups:betterperformance,generalperformanceandpoorperformance.Eachgroupareregressedanalysis.Theresultsshow:thedifferentlevelofperformancebetweenthesamenatureofpropertyrightsunderthegroups,theregressionresultsweredifferentforeachgroup,andwiththefullsampleregressionresultsarealsodifferent;andthesamelevelofperformancebetweenthedifferentnatureofpropertyrightsunderthegroups,theregressionresultsaredifferenttoo.Becauseeachperformancelevelofthecompanyhasitsowncharacteristics,maybeitisnotappropriateforothercompaniestochoicethesamepolicywiththebetterperformedcompanywhenselectingandappointingseniorexecutives.Finally,accordingtotheregressionresultsineachgroup,consideringeachcompany'sownperformancelevel,accordingtothecharacteristicsofeachtypeofstate-ownedenterprisesandprivateenterprises,weproposespecificrecommendationsandpointoutthelimitationsofthispaper.

ABSTRACT

Withthenon-tradablesharesreformandperfectionofChina'sstockissuingsystem,privateequityplacementshavebecomethemainwayofre-financingofthelistcompany.Privateequityplacementshavebecomethepreferredchoiceforthelistcompanyconsideringre-financingwithstrongoperability,highvalue-addedbenefits,convenientprocedure,lowentrycost,lessexpenditure.?Fromtheperspectiveofenterpriseitself,canberealizedbyattractingstrategicinvestorstopurchaselistedcompanyasawhole;?canalsobyadjustingownershipstructuretoimprovetheeffectivenessofcorporategovernance;?canalsobyrealizingfinancinganddebtintheshorttermtoimprovethecompaniesinfinancialdistress.?Alongwiththeimprovementofourcapitalmarketreform,protectingtheinterestsoftheinvestorshavealsobeenontheschedule,becominganimportantgoalofregulatory.?Admittedly,China'scapitalmarketisnotmatureenough.Inordertofurtheroptimizethestructureofinvestors,governmentsupportingthedevelopmentofinstitutionalinvestorsinChina,alsoattractingforeigninvestorstoentertheChinesemarketgradually.?Therefore,thegovernmentissuedaseriesofsupportingpolicies,encouraginginvestorstoparticipateinthefinancingoftheenterprisefinancingdecisionandtheinternalcontrolmanagement,tostandardizerelateddecision-makingbehaviorofcontrollingshareholdersandcorporateexecutives.?Benefitingfromthesepoliciesandmeasuresissuedtimely,characteristicsofinvestorsincreasinglyhavesignificantinfluenceonthedecision-makingbehaviorofenterprise.?Inrecentyears,domesticmediarevealedpartofequityfinancingoflistedcompaniesencumbered,inadditiontoinvestmentprojectitselflackofsustainedprofitability,thedeviationofjudgmentbymanagementoncharacteristicsofinvestors.?Inthedesignforequityfinancingoflistedcompanies,havetothinkaboutthelikelyimpactofinvestorsfeatures.Onthisbasis,studyonprivateequityplacementsandcharacteristicsofinvestorshaveaprofoundpracticalsignificance.?SincepromulgatedbyChinaSecuritiesRegulatoryCommission（CSRC），academicstudyonprivateequityplacementshasbecomethefocusofthecompanyequityfinancingresearch.Makingarationaljudgmentontherelationshipofprivateequityplacementsandcharacteristicsofinvestorshasbeenanewresearchdirection,whichattractsmoreandmoreattentionofscholars.Onthebasisofstudytheliteratureofprivateequityplacements,wefoundthatthedomesticresearchfocusedmainlyontheannouncementeffectofprivateequityplacement,?motivationanalysisofenterpriseandanalysisonthephenomenonthattheactualcontroloftheshareholdersseeprivateequityplacementjustastunneling.Accordingtothis,onthebaseofempiricalevidenceoflistedcompanies,analyzeandsummarizetherelationshipofobjectsofprivateequityplacementandcorporateperformance.Thusacomprehensiveunderstandingcanbegotthatnon-publicissuancehavingimpactoncompany'slong-termperformance.

Gainingknowledgeandexperiencefrompracticecanalsoenrichandperfectthetheoreticalbasisofprivateequityplacement,inadditionto,haveapositiveguidingroletofinancingactivityinourcountrycapitalmarket.

Basedontheasymmetricinformationhypothesis,theprincipal-agenttheory,supervisioneffecthypothesis,defensivehypothesisasthetheoreticalbasisforempiricalresearch,excessiveconcentrationofequitywillgiverisetoactualcontrolshareholdersmanipulatingthepossibilityofcorporategovernance,soastodamagethesmallandmedium-sizedshareholdersprofit.?Coretradeassociationshareholdersarelimitedlyrational.Relatedpartytransactionisatoolfortunneling.Inordertoachievethepersonalinterestsandintroducepassiveinvestors,managementpreventsenteringactiveinvestors.Comparedwithabovethreetypesinvestors,outsideinvestordependsmoreonpublicinformation,canbemoreobjectiveforthecompanytomakepredictions.Therefore,objectsofprivateequityplacementinevitablycontactwithcorporateperformance,andofferingtodifferentinvestorswillbringdifferentinfluencetocorporateperformance.

ThispaperselectedA-sharelistedcompanieswhichapprovedbyCSRCandsuccessfullyissuedfrom2011to2013asempiricalsample.Fromtheperspectiveofinvestorsheterogeneousbeliefs,combinedwithnon-publicannouncementoflistedcompanies,objectsofprivateequityplacementcanbedividedintofourcategories:（1）Onlytheshareholderparticipationincorporategovernance（CGS）；（2）Relatedtransactionshareholder（RTS）；（3）Director,supervisorsandseniormanagement（DSM）；（4）Externalinvestors（OUT）。Abovefourtypesareexplainedvariable.Thispaperfromdebtpayingability,profitability,operatingability,growthabilityandcashflowabilitythisfiveaspects,selectedrepresentativefinancialindicatorstobuildascoremodelaboutcorporateperformance,andthescoreiscalculatedtomeasurethecompany'sperformance,asexplainedvariable.Inadditionto,scaleofcompany,financialleverage,operatingleverageandreturnonstockscanberegardascontrolvariablesinordertotestthepurchaseobjectwiththecompany'soperatingperformanceofmultipleregressionanalysis.Throughthemethodofregressionanalysistoverifythehypothesisisputforward,soastodemonstratethedirectionalissuanceobjectexistsbetweentheinevitablecontactswithcorporateperformance.Throughregressionanalysis,wecandrawtheconclusion:considerparticipatingincorporategovernancewithoutrelatedtransactionsofshareholders,themanagementofthecorebusinessscopeofshareholders,directors,supervisorsandseniormanagementhasadverseeffectonthecorporateperformance.However,fortheoutsideinvestorsunrelateddirectionalissuancehasabeneficialeffectoncorporateperformance.

Paperbasedonthebackgroundofprivaterights,toinformationasymmetryhypothesisandsupervisingthehypothesisanddefensehypothesisasthetheoreticalbasis,whichleadstotheorientationobjectofrightsandcorporateperformancecorrelationresearch,andtoimprovethepublicissuanceofequityfinancingmethods,reducelargeshareholdersandminorityshareholdersproxyconflict,providesawaytoimprovecompanyperformance.